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Abstract
Background: In the recent past, the introduction of Classical Swine Fever Virus (CSFV) followed
by between-herd spread has given rise to a number of large epidemics in The Netherlands and
Belgium. Both these countries are pork-exporting countries. Particularly important in these
epidemics has been the occurrence of substantial "neighborhood transmission" from herd to herd
in the presence of base-line control measures prescribed by EU legislation. Here we propose a
calculation procedure to map out "high-risk areas" for local between-herd spread of CSFV as a tool
to support decision making on prevention and control of CSFV outbreaks. In this procedure the
identification of such areas is based on an estimated inter-herd distance dependent probability of
neighborhood transmission or "local transmission". Using this distance-dependent probability, we
derive a threshold value for the local density of herds. In areas with local herd density above
threshold, local transmission alone can already lead to epidemic spread, whereas in below-
threshold areas this is not the case. The first type of area is termed 'high-risk' for spread of CSFV,
while the latter type is termed 'low-risk'.
Results: As we show for the case of The Netherlands, once the distance-dependent probability of
local transmission has been estimated from CSFV outbreak data, it is possible to produce a map of
the country in which areas of high-risk herds and of low-risk herds are identified. We made these
maps even more informative by estimating border zones between the two types of areas. In these
border zones the risk of local transmission of infection to a nearby high-risk area exceeds a certain
level.
Conclusion: The risk maps provide an easily understandable visualization of the spatial
heterogeneities in transmission risk. They serve as a tool for area-specific designs of control
strategies, and possibly also for spatial planning of areas where livestock farming is allowed. Similar
risk maps can in principle be constructed for other highly-transmissible livestock infections that
spread via neighborhood transmission.
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Classical swine fever (CSF, hog cholera) is a highly conta-
gious disease of pigs and wild boar that is caused by CSFV.
The symptoms of the disease include fever, lethargy, ano-
rexia and conjunctivitis [1]. Regions with CSFV-infected
pig populations are subjected to trade restrictions world-
wide.
The base-line containment strategy, as prescribed in 1980
by European Union (EU) directive 80/217/EEC, to deal
with CSFV outbreaks includes killing all animals on
infected farms, movement stand-still, intensive surveil-
lance, and zoo-sanitary measures [2]. This strategy
appeared insufficiently effective during the CSFV outbreak
in The Netherlands in 1997–1998 [3]; in particular it was
observed that substantial transmission still occurred
between herds typically at less than a few kilometers from
each other. Such transmission events have been termed
"neighborhood infections" [4,5]. Similar neighborhood
infections were found in other CSFV epidemics in Ger-
many [6], and Belgium [7]. To control the Dutch CSFV
epidemic, the base-line containment strategy was
extended with a pre-emptive slaughter of "neighboring
herds" (more precisely, ring culling within a 1 kilometer
radius from infected herds). Although this additional
measure appeared to be effective to control the epidemic
[3], it was not supported by public opinion. Public criti-
cism concentrated on the fact that a very large number of
healthy, non-infected animals was destroyed.
The aim of this paper is to use epidemiological informa-
tion to help policy makers to design well-balanced control
measures. In particular, it is often possible to optimize
control measures by adjusting the extent to which pre-
emptive slaughter is applied to the herd density of the
region at hand. This is based on the observation that den-
sity of herds is an important predictor of the risk of neigh-
borhood spread. For example, the per-herd probability of
becoming infected with CSFV increased with herd density
in the Dutch 1997/1998 epidemic, as was shown by
Benard et al. [8] based on survival analysis. The relevance
of herd density has also been noted in economically moti-
vated analyses that used detailed CSFV transmission mod-
eling [9-11]. According to these analyses, in sparsely
populated livestock areas it would be both epidemiologi-
cally and economically optimal to apply zoo-sanitary
measures and cull infectious herds, whereas in densely
populated livestock areas additional control measures
would be necessary to control an outbreak of CSFV. In
addition, Mintiens et al. [7] suggested using Belgian out-
break data that a kernel-based measure of the local density
of pig herds was the best explaining variable (amongst a
wide range of candidate variables) for the risk of neigh-
borhood transmission. This measure was defined by
Mintiens et al. [7] as a weighted sum over nearby herds,
using a particular spatial kernel as a weighting factor. The
spatial kernel is given by a function p(r) of the distance r
between the reference herd and the neighboring herd and
is assumed to be independent of the local density of
herds. Mintiens et al. [7] proposed a methodology for cal-
culating risk maps for neighborhood transmission, by
identifying as high-risk those areas in which the local den-
sity measure exceeds a certain threshold. The threshold
density is chosen such that the pattern of high-risk and
low-risk areas matches with observations on neighbor-
hood transmission in the outbreak data.
The first contribution of this paper is to propose the use of
an epidemiologically motivated spatial kernel p(r) for the
calculation of the local herd density. Such a spatial kernel
in essence determines the probability of local between-
herd transmission, as will be explained below. In this
paper we use an existing estimate of the spatial kernel for
neighborhood transmission, based on data from the CSF
epidemic in 1997/1998. This kernel doesn't include other
(non-local) transmission. We will come back to this point
in the Discussion. The second new element is the use of an
epidemiologically motivated threshold density. This
threshold density corresponds to the critical value of the
reproduction ratio for spatial transmission as described by
Boender et al. [12]. As we explain below, the two new ele-
ments lead to risk maps with the following interpretation:
When the virus is introduced in an area with local herd
density above threshold, neighborhood transmission
alone can already lead to substantial local epidemic
spread, whereas in below-threshold areas this is not the
case. In epidemiology, substantial (local) epidemic spread
is called a major outbreak to distinguish it from minor
outbreaks implying self-limiting (local) spread. Risk maps
based on the threshold approach can easily be explained
to non-experts and used as a tool to help policy makers to
design well-balanced control measures.
Results
In Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 we use the example of The Neth-
erlands to illustrate the use of the risk map construction as
explained in the Methods section. These risk maps for the
spread of CSFV are based on the pig farm location data for
2004 (the most recent available to us). In Figure 1 we
investigate the predicted effect of the duration of the infec-
tious period of a farm T on the size of the high-risk areas
in the Netherlands by mapping out these areas (including
border zones) for T equal to 3, 6 and 9 weeks. For T equals
3 weeks none of the herds was classified as high-risk. In
this case, the desired situation with no risk of major out-
breaks is fulfilled for all herds. In Figure 1 the individual
high-risk herd locations cannot be distinguished due to
the high degree of clustering. In order to make this distinc-
tion and to appreciate the number of herds included in
these areas, we zoom in on the individual areas with high-Page 2 of 12
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Estimated high-risk areas for local spatial spread of Classical Swine Fever in The NetherlandsFigure 1
Estimated high-risk areas for local spatial spread of Classical Swine Fever in The Netherlands. High-risk areas 
including "border zones" as explained in the Methods section, for an infectious period of 6 weeks (green) and 9 weeks (blue). 
The border zone radius equals 2.5 km.
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Central part of The Netherlands: detailed map of the estimated areas with high risk herds for local spatial spread of Classical Swine FeverFigu e 2
Central part of The Netherlands: detailed map of the estimated areas with high risk herds for local spatial 
spread of Classical Swine Fever. The high-risk locations (including herds in the border zones, for an infectious period of 6 
weeks) are indicated with black diamonds. The scale of the grid (horizontal and vertical black lines) is 10 km × 10 km. The bor-
der zone radius equals 2.5 km.
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Eastern part of The Netherlands: detailed map of the estimated areas with high risk herds for local spatial spread of Classical Swine FeverFigu e 3
Eastern part of The Netherlands: detailed map of the estimated areas with high risk herds for local spatial 
spread of Classical Swine Fever. The high-risk locations (including herds in the border zones, for an infectious period of 6 
weeks) are indicated with black diamonds. The scale of the grid (horizontal and vertical black lines) is 10 km × 10 km. The bor-
der zone radius equals 2.5 km.
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Southern part of The Netherlands: detailed map of the estimated areas with high risk herds for local spatial spread of Classical wine FeverFigur  4
Southern part of The Netherlands: detailed map of the estimated areas with high risk herds for local spatial 
spread of Classical Swine Fever. The high-risk locations (including herds in the border zones, for an infectious period of 6 
weeks) are indicated with black diamonds. The scale of the grid (horizontal and vertical black lines) is 10 km × 10 km. The bor-
der zone radius equals 2.5 km.
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Southeastern part of The Netherlands: detailed map of the estimated areas with high risk herds for local spatial spread of Clas-sical Swin  FeveFigur  5
Southeastern part of The Netherlands: detailed map of the estimated areas with high risk herds for local spa-
tial spread of Classical Swine Fever. The high-risk locations (including herds in the border zones, for an infectious period 
of 6 weeks) are indicated with black diamonds. The scale of the grid (horizontal and vertical black lines) is 10 km × 10 km. The 
border zone radius equals 2.5 km.
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T = 6 weeks. The most immediate way in which the risk
map provides clues for limiting the use of pre-emptive
slaughter is by identification of the low-risk areas, where
"base-line EU measures" should be sufficient to at least
locally control the virus spread. Furthermore, the results
in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 show that the infectious period
T is a very important variable: the predicted size of the
high-risk areas for CSFV in The Netherlands drops dramat-
ically with decreasing T. This means that if it is possible to
reduce T by an intensification of the surveillance program,
this can in some high-risk areas remove the necessity to
introduce pre-emptive slaughter or emergency vaccina-
tion.
We note that as the infectious period T appears in Equa-
tion (1) in the methods section multiplying the rate λ(r),
the results shown in Figure 1 can also be viewed as results
for a fixed value of T (T = 6) but with different rescalings
of λ. The T = 3 map then corresponds to a 50% reduction
of λ and the T = 9 map to a 50% increase of λ.
Discussion
We have shown that it is possible to map out areas at high
(and low) risk of local between-farm spread of CSFV. The
first building block of the method used is an estimated
probability of local CSFV transmission from an infectious
to a susceptible herd as a function of the distance between
these herds (spatial transmission kernel). If in addition
the set of all current locations (in a region) of herds with
pigs is available, the estimated kernel can be used to meas-
ure the expected amount of neighborhood transmission
by calculating a local reproduction ratio Rhi for each herd
i. This local reproduction ratio can be viewed as a measure
of local herd density [12]. This explains the earlier identi-
fication of local herd density as risk predictor [7]. How-
ever, due to the existence of a threshold at Rhi = 1, the
transmission risk is a nonlinear function of local density.
This threshold behavior of local epidemic spread at the
value 1 for the reproduction ratio provides a natural divi-
sion between high- and low-risk herds, resulting in the
definition of high- and low-risk areas for local epidemic
virus spread between farms. In this way, we obtain a nat-
ural and quantitative link between local herd density (as
measured by Rhi) and risk of neighborhood transmission.
The spatial kernel used in this paper originates from an
analysis of the 1997/1998 CSFV-epidemic in The Nether-
lands by Stegeman et al. [4]. It describes the transmission
probability between nearby herds as a function of the dis-
tance between these herds, and represents the combined
effect of various possible (untraceable) types of "neigh-
borhood" contact that may still exist in the presence of
base-line intervention measures. This spatial kernel does
not include transmission through traceable and through
long-distance (>2 km) contacts. Long-distance contacts
may include transport of animals, which should ideally be
controlled by enforcement of a movement standstill.
The high-risk areas we identified are defined as those areas
where neighborhood transmission alone can already lead
to substantial epidemic spread. In those areas neighbor-
hood transmission should be controlled using local meas-
ures such as pre-emptive slaughter and emergency
vaccination. In these high-risk areas, the EU base-line
intervention measures are insufficient to control the local
propagation of an epidemic. The questions whether this
local propagation could be stopped by taking additional
measures (e.g. pre-emptive slaughter or emergency vacci-
nation), and if so, what is the minimum of effort required,
are left for future work. In principle, these issues can be
studied using a simulation approach similar to the one
used here to calculate border zones to the high-risk areas.
The purpose of "neighborhood policies" such as pre-emp-
tive slaughter or emergency vaccination can be viewed as
achieving a reduction of the density of susceptible herds
from above to below the threshold density. Furthermore,
the threshold property opens up the possibility that an
emergency vaccination strategy using an imperfect vaccine
(in the sense that it does not protect all herds) could still
be successful in reducing the effective local density of sus-
ceptible herds to below the threshold density.
We note that if herds are strongly clustered, the size of the
high-risk areas may be quite insensitive to the detailed
shape (i.e. r-dependence) of the function p(r). In this case
it may be possible to produce an accurate risk map even in
the presence of large uncertainty in the kernel estimate.
Mintiens et al. [7] found that local herd density is a risk
predictor for herd infection with CSFV and suggested the
use of density maps for predicting the risk of transmission
of CSFV infection from the neighborhood to the reference
herd. Their risk map is based on an ad-hoc spatial kernel
and an ad-hoc critical density. The perspective of the risk-
map construction by Mintiens et al. [7] is from a suscepti-
ble reference herd that is running a risk of acquiring infec-
tion, whereas we have considered the perspective of the
transmission risk from the reference herd to the neighbor-
hood. This different perspective allows us to present an
epidemiologically based spatial kernel, and also an epide-
miologically based threshold density. Our approach to
quantify neighborhood transmission risk results in two
similarities with Mintiens et al. [7]: firstly, neighborhood
transmission risk is quantified by a herd density measure,
and secondly, this herd density measure counts different
types of herds in the same way. The first similarity is due
in our approach to the assumption that the neighborhood
transmission risk can be described by a function that only
depends on the between-herd distance r. Rephrased inPage 8 of 12
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homogeneous (independent of location) and isotropic
(directionally independent). The second is due to the
model assumption that this function is independent of
the size and type of (either source or target) herd. The fact
noted by Mintiens et al. [7] that the local herd density is a
good predictor of neighborhood transmission risk sug-
gests that such a homogeneous description works well for
the purpose of mapping out this transmission risk. This is
despite the fact that in reality some aspects of transmis-
sion have been shown to be heterogeneous. In particular,
heterogeneities have been observed by Benard et al. [8] in
the form of differences in the infection risk of different
types of herds. Also, differences in the infection risk of dif-
ferent herd-size categories have been detected by Elbers et
al. [13], with infection risk not always increasing with
herd size. Even if the identification of individual high-risk
farms may suffer from inaccuracy due to the assumed
homogeneity, the effect on the identification of the over-
all areas in which such farms typically cluster is, as evi-
denced by the results of Mintiens et al. [7], much less.
The risk maps produced here are calculated to apply to the
situation in 2004 (as they are based on the farm location
data for that year). The number of pig farms in The Neth-
erlands is declining, and has decreased by about 30%
between 1997 and 2004. We note that, whereas the distri-
bution over herd types has not changed much since 1997/
98, the mean herd size in The Netherlands in 2004 is
about 30% higher than in 1997. In calculating risk maps
for 2004 based on the transmission characteristics during
the 1997/98 epidemic we have thus assumed that these
characteristics are not much affected by a 30% increase of
the mean herd size. Also, we do not attempt to take into
account any decrease that may have occurred in the neigh-
borhood transmission between herds due to improve-
ment of biosecurity since 1998, due to the absence of
quantitative information required to estimate such a
decrease.
In this paper we have constructed risk maps for neighbor-
hood transmission of CSFV, but the method is in fact very
generally applicable. Applying the proposed method
requires the availability of the spatial kernel of the infec-
tious disease under consideration and the availability of
an accurate and complete database of the geographical
position of herds at risk. Here we have used a spatial ker-
nel for CSFV neighborhood transmission estimated by
Stegeman et al. [4]. We note that the kernel estimation
requires knowledge of the moment of virus introduction
in each infected herd and of the moment farms are
removed (by depopulation), in order to determine the
period of time over which each individual infected herd
was infectious to other herds. Because in practice the
moment of virus introduction is often difficult to deter-
mine it is recommended to do a sensitivity analysis or to
use a Bayesian estimation approach. Stegeman et al. [4]
estimated the time of virus introduction for each infected
herd using data on contacts between infected herds and
using serological findings on infected farms obtained
shortly before depopulation [14]. Once the period of
infectiousness of each infected herd is estimated, the esti-
mation of the spatial kernel is in principle straightfor-
ward. Firstly, for any given functional form of the kernel,
the model likelihood can be constructed by taking into
account all transmission events together with all herds
escaping from infection. Secondly, standard Maximum-
Likelihood estimation, or an equivalent generalized linear
model (GLM) estimation as used by Stegeman et al. [4],
can be applied to estimate the kernel parameters.
In the context of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus transmis-
sion between farms in Great Britain in 2001, a spatial ker-
nel has been estimated from outbreak data by Ferguson et
al. [15]. Similarly, for Avian Influenza transmission in The
Netherlands, kernels have been estimated by Boender et
al. [16] in an extensive spatial analysis of 2003 epidemic
data. In future work we are planning to apply the same
method of analysis to the 1997/1998 CSFV epidemic data,
estimating a "full" spatial kernel for CSFV transmission.
Such a kernel, and the risk maps constructed from it,
would not only take into account neighborhood transmis-
sion, but also any transmission remaining despite the
presence of movement restrictions through either tracea-
ble contacts, or untraceable contacts over distances longer
than 2 km. Due to the additional transmission risks
included, we would expect that the resulting risk maps
would show more high-risk herds (i.e. bigger high-risk
areas and possibly more areas) than shown in Figures 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5.
Conclusion
We have presented a natural approach to construct herd-
density-based risk maps for the local spread of CSFV and
illustrated the approach by calculating risk maps for The
Netherlands. Our approach explains the previous finding
by Mintiens et al. [7] that herd density can serve as a pre-
dictor of transmission risk. We believe that the risk maps
provide an easily understandable visualization of the spa-
tial heterogeneities in transmission risk. A risk map serves
as a tool for area-specific designs of control strategies, and
possibly also for spatial planning of areas where livestock
farming is allowed. We have shown that when the infec-
tious period can be reduced to 3 weeks via such a control
strategy no high-risk areas for neighborhood transmission
of CSFV are left in The Netherlands. The approach pre-
sented here can be applied to other infections in other
countries, as long as an accurate data set of the geograph-
ical locations of livestock herds and an estimate of the
spatial kernel of that specific infection are available.Page 9 of 12
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We work out a procedure for calculating a risk map for the
neighborhood transmission of CSFV. In essence, two
pieces of information are required as input for the calcu-
lation. The first is the set of spatial locations of all (cur-
rent) farms with pigs in the country. The second is an
estimate of the distance-dependent probability of neigh-
borhood transmission of CSFV.
Database of herd locations
The National Animal Health Service maintains a database
of spatial location information for all locations with pigs
in The Netherlands, in which the positions of locations
are given in meters {X,Y}, according the official cadastral
system in The Netherlands (RD-coordinates). From the
2004 database we used geographical coordinates (point
locations) and type of location (market places, slaughter-
houses, rendering plants, recreational farms (containing
less than 5 pigs), and four types of commercial pig farms).
We excluded locations from the analysis with location
type such as slaughterhouses, market places, and render-
ing plants. At these locations no pigs were assumed to be
present during the outbreak of CSFV due to the zoo-sani-
tary measures. All other farms were included in the analy-
sis.
If more than one owner of pigs or more than one herd
type was registered at the same geographical location, we
considered that location as one single herd. If one farm
had pigs housed on different geographical locations, we
considered each location as a separate herd. All together,
we used a total net number of about 15,000 pig herds in
the analysis.
Method to assign risk levels to herds
In this section we describe how we combined the herd
location data with an estimate of the probability of trans-
mission – the second piece of information in the method
– to obtain risk maps for the neighborhood spread of
CSFV in the presence of base-line control measures pre-
scribed by EU legislation. In the analysis of 1997–1998
CSF epidemic in The Netherlands by Stegeman et al. [4] a
division was made between transmission via traceable
contacts and short-range distance-dependent "neighbor-
hood transmission". In this work we focus on the latter
type of transmission. The probability of neighborhood
transmission p(r), can be written as
p(r) = 1 - exp(- λ(r)T), (1)
in which r is the Euclidean (straight-line) distance from
infected herd to susceptible herd, T is the mean infectious
period of a herd and λ(r) is the distance-dependent rate of
neighborhood transmission. Stegeman et al. [4] estimate
λ(r) from observed herd infections that arose from
untraced neighborhood contacts in the 1997–1998 CSF
epidemic in The Netherlands. Using a step function to
approximate the rate λ(r), their result is:
For the estimation of this rate both the number of infected
and uninfected herds in the 1997–1998 CSF epidemic in
The Netherlands is used. A major part of infected herds
was reported due to clinical symptoms. A small part of
pre-emptively slaughtered herds was diagnosed positive
after having been slaughtered based on serum and blood
samples taken shortly before culling [3]. As the sensitivity
of the detection procedure used is considered to be very
high, the data set should enable an accurate estimation of
the rate of neighborhood transmission λ(r). The mean
infectious period T of a herd (in the presence of base-line
control measures) has been also estimated by Stegeman et
al. [14].
It was found that T varied in time, being 6 weeks early on
in the epidemic, and being reduced to about 3 weeks later
on. To investigate the effect of T on the size of high-risk
areas we have carried out calculations for T = 3, T = 6, and
T = 9 weeks.
Using the calculational framework developed by Boender
et al. [12], the availability of an estimated between-herd
transmission probability p(r) allows one to calculate a
measure for the expected amount of neighborhood trans-
mission for each individual herd i, given by the local
reproduction ratio Rhi. If a herd i infects a herd j a distance
rij away with probability p(rij), on average herd i will infect
the following number of herds [12]:
in which the summation is over all the herds j excluding
herd i. The factor fc compensates the effects of "local
depletion" of the pool of neighboring susceptible herds
(i.e. effects relating to neighboring herds already being
infected) and is defined and calculated in Ref. [12]. As
local depletion reduces the number of herds potentially
infected by the source herd, the factor fc is bigger than one
(i.e. fc > 1). In our case this factor fc equals 1.5, 1.7, and 1.9
for T = 3, T = 6, and T = 9 weeks, respectively.
As the reproduction ratio Rhi is a weighted sum of all
neighboring herds according to Equation (3), it is a meas-
ure of the local density of herds at each location i. A stand-
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"major outbreaks" can only occur if the reproduction ratio
(R) is larger than one, i.e. if R > 1 [17,18]. In our context,
the concept of a major outbreak translates into epidemic
spread of the virus from herds with local reproduction
ratio larger than one. For local reproduction ratios below
one at most only a few transmission events will take place,
i.e. no progressing epidemic spread will locally occur (see
below for a detailed explanation). As a consequence, we
may classify herds with Rhi < 1 as low-risk herds and herds
with Rhi > 1 as high-risk herds. By calculating Rhi for each
pig herd i in the country we are able to identify high-risk
areas as areas spanned by groups of neighboring high-risk
herds.
Method to discriminate between high-risk and low-risk 
areas
The most straightforward way to construct a risk map is by
simply color-coding the two classes of herds on a map,
thus visualizing areas with high-risk herds and areas with
low-risk herds. We note however that an outbreak of CSFV
starting at a low-risk herd situated in the neighborhood of
an area with high-risk herds may often reach that area and
still lead to a major outbreak. A way to take this effect into
account is by adding border zones to high-risk areas.
We used a simulation approach to determine the border
zone. This approach is based on the observation that the
distance-dependent probability of virus transmission
given in Equation (1) defines a spatial transmission
model for which random epidemics can be generated on
the set of all pig herds in the country. In detail, starting
from a single infected herd, the second generation of
infections can be generated by assigning randomly
(according the distance-dependent probability) infectious
contacts of the neighboring herds with the infected herd.
From the second generation the third generation of
infected herds is randomly generated and so on. At some
point the epidemic terminates, either because no area
with high risk herds is reached (minor outbreak), or
because after such an area was hit, the number of high risk
herds in that area is exhausted (major outbreak). For each
individual 'low-risk' herd we generated 100 different epi-
demics starting from that herd, and recorded the total
number of herds infected in each epidemic (i.e. its final
size). Subsequently we inspected these 100 final sizes to
see if they contained any major outbreaks. For each of the
'low-risk' herds that nevertheless gave rise to major out-
breaks, we calculated the distance to the nearest high-risk
herd. We fixed the value of the border zone radius around
the areas with high-risk herds such that it contained 95%
of the 'low-risk' herds that gave rise to major outbreaks.
We varied the critical size beyond which an outbreak was
called 'major' in this calculation between 10 and 100
infected herds. As the results were found to be insensitive
to the precise critical size as long as it was chosen larger
than or equal to 40 infected herds, we have used the criti-
cal size of 40 in the results below.
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